The memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran is not – and could not be – a simple ceasefire text. It is the first impression of a new, fragile balance in the Middle East and a road map 14 key points for the next day not only in Tehran–Washington relations but for the entire Middle East.
On paper he ends hostilities, reopens the Straits of Hormuz and restores Washington and Tehran to the nuclear negotiating table. In practice, however, it does something more structural: it carries the weight from the field of military pressure to the field of political transaction.
The moment of Donald Trump's signing of the deal
🚨 President Donald J. Trump has SIGNED the Iran Memorandum of Understanding at Versailles in France. 🇺🇸 pic.twitter. Com/JQ6qlbvFAF— The White House (@WhiteHouse) June 17, 2026
The first and most charged wording concerns Lebanon. The text is not just about ending operations between the US and Iran. It provides for immediate and permanent termination of military operations "on all fronts", including Lebanon, and a commitment to respect its territorial integrity and sovereignty. This is the point read in Israel as a red alert. Because Lebanon does not appear as a side crisis. It enters the core of an American-Iran text. Tehran thus acquires a diplomatic tool for any future Israeli blow against Hezbollah or for any discussion around the southern safety zone.
For Israel, this is perhaps the most dangerous precedent. Netanyahu government does not want to link Iranian issue with Lebanon. Hezbollah does not want to go indirectly under an umbrella of American-Iranian understanding and does not want to restrict the freedom of action of the Israeli army from an agreement in which it itself has not signed.
The second foundation of the memorandum is mutual commitment to non-intervention. The two sides undertake to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and not interfere in their internal affairs. The phrase looks typical. It's not. It comes after years of open hostility, accusations of influence operations, destabilization plans, targeted actions and status change rhetoric. For Tehran, this wording acts as political security. For Trump, it is a retreat from the language of complete overthrow to the language of management.
The timetable provided for is stifling: final agreement within 60 days, with possibility of extension. In fact, it is hard to believe that within two months the nuclear programme, sanctions, committed funds, the Ormuz regime, the role of regional forces and the presence of American forces near Iran will be solved. 60 days is more political than a technical timetable. Trump needs an immediate picture of success. Iran needs immediate economic breath. They both need time without war.
Where the deal becomes immediately tangible is at seaThe United States undertakes to immediately begin lifting the naval blockade and terminate it fully within 30 days. At the same time, following the final agreement, American forces are expected to be removed from Iran's proximity. This is a clean Tehran victory. Iran regains export, import and economic capacity. For Washington, however, there is a price: it loses one of the main pressure levers before closing the hardest part of the negotiation.
Even more sensitive is the spot for the Straits of Hormuz. Iran commits to secure safe passage of merchant ships free of charge - but only for 60 days. This detail may prove strategic. If after the two months Tehran acquires the possibility of imposing charges or a new role in managing transit, then the global energy trade does not return exactly to pre-war regularity. It enters a new regime, where control of one of the world's most important sea corridors will go through political consultation with Iran and Oman, but also with the other coastal states of the Persian Gulf.
The economic arm is just as heavy. The memorandum provides for a plan of at least $300 billion for Iran's reconstruction and economic development, involving regional partners. Trump insists that the U.S. won't put the money themselves. But it leaves the way for funding from Gulf States open. For Tehran, this amounts to a prospect of reintegration. For the Gulf monarchies, it can be the price of a difficult stability. For Trump, it is a political risk, as it reminds - on a much larger scale - of the accusations he himself made against the 2015 agreement.
In the heart of the bargain are the sanctions. The United States undertakes to end, on the basis of an agreed timetable, UN sanctions, International Atomic Energy Agency decisions and American primary and secondary sanctions. This is the real reward Iran is asking for. Without lifting sanctions, no Iranian leadership will accept substantial nuclear concessions. The crucial question is the order: what is removed first, what remains as a guarantee and who will certify that Tehran respects its commitments.
The nuclear issue, despite its importance, remains the most unclear part of the text. Iran 'reaffirms' that it will not acquire nuclear weapons. The word has weight, but not new substance. Tehran has already made a corresponding commitment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The new element is the provision for degradation of enriched material under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. But the material is not intended to leave the country. And that leaves the big question open: whether Iran will really lose its nuclear potential or whether it will simply freeze it to a lower intensity.
Until the final agreement, the two sides agree to maintain the current status quo. Iran will not proceed with its nuclear programme. The United States will not impose new sanctions or develop additional forces in the region. This creates a basis for negotiations. It also limits the American possibility of escalation. In fact, the program is not being solved. It freezes as it is after the blows, with installations damaged or semi-functional and with the enriched material remaining the big thorn.
The immediate economic breath for Tehran is not limited there. The US Treasury will issue exemptions for exports of Iranian crude, petroleum products and related services - from banking to insurance and transport. In addition, frozen or limited Iranian funds will be made available by implementing the Memorandum. The wording is broad: money can be used for payments to any final beneficiary appointed by the Central Bank of Iran. This is perhaps one of the points that will cause the most severe reactions in Washington, as it can be read as too much economic relaxation before there is a final nuclear agreement.
To prevent the memorandum from remaining just a political statement, an implementing mechanism for monitoring its implementation and future compliance is provided for. There it will be judged much of its credibility. The United States will request verifiable commitments. Iran will try to avoid a permanent surveillance regime. The same applies to the order of the next steps: first the closure of businesses, the lifting of the blockade, the opening of Hormuz, the oil exemptions and the release of funds - and then the effective negotiation of the final agreement. This is the most vulnerable point for Washington and the most useful for Tehran. Iran gets the immediate benefits ahead. The U.S. gets ahead of the cessation of war and the reopening of Hormuz. The nuclear, however, remains for phase two.
The final agreement, if any, will be adopted by a binding resolution of UN Security Council. That would give her institutional weight and international coverage. But "if" is huge. The nuclear gap remains. Israel has no reason to feel safe. Trump's critics will talk about early concessions. Tehran will try to turn economic breath into negotiating time.
This data deal does not solve the Iranian Gordian bond. It freezes him. It doesn't destroy the nuclear program. He's moving it to a new negotiation round. It does not fully restore the old order to the Persian Gulf. It creates a new, more complex balance, where Iran comes out injured but not defeated, the US appears as a force that stopped the war but lost part of the pressure, and Israel remains with the most difficult question: how far can it accept an agreement that limits the war, but does not eliminate the threat.