The framework agreement (a memorandum of understanding in fact) between the United States and Iran may pave the way for the end of the Gulf war, but this does not mean a return to previous normality.

The war that began with the American-Israeli bombings against Iran on February 28 did not just cause a temporary disturbance in the markets. He moved deeper shifts. In energy, commerce, geopolitical balance, the relationship of allies with Washington, even the way economies plan over the next decade. Based on the facts, people should accept that even if the conflict is over, we will not go back to where we were before the US and Israeli operation against Iran.

Energy rewrites its rules
The first and strongest shock concerns energy. Almost total paralysis in oil and gas deliveries from the Middle East, combined with price ejecting, abruptly changed the debate on energy security. For the countries of Asia and Europe dependent on imports, the crisis acted as a reminder of how vulnerable they are to this factor. Japan, South Korea and other major industrial economies saw again that their energy stability can be judged by a narrow sea pass, by a missile attack or by a Tehran decision.

In the short term, this even led to steps backwards. In some countries the use of coal, a more polluting fuel, was increased just to ensure adequacy. In the long run, however, the direction is different. The new shock, second within four years after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is expected to speed up the search for alternatives: renewable sources, nuclear power, storage, electric drive.

The difference with 2022 is that this time technology is more mature. The batteries are better, electric cars cheaper, photovoltaics and wind more competitive. The transition that a few years ago seemed expensive or slow, now appears as an economic necessity. Not just as an environmental choice.

The crack in OPEC and the new battle of producers
The war has not only changed consumers. He also changed the producers. The tension between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia deepened, leading the Emirates to the exit from OPEC. The full impact of this move will be seen when production in the region returns to higher rates. But the message is already clear: the agency which has been trying to control the oil supply for decades appears weaker. A weaker OPEC means more unstable markets. Less discipline in production, more competition between producers, more difficulty predicting prices.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia moves closer to Russia. Her presence as a "honored country" at the economic forum in St Petersburg was not merely symbolic. He showed that Riyadh reads the new juncture not only through Washington, but also through Moscow. Russia, the second largest power in oil and gas after the United States, comes out stronger in this sector at a time when it is in great need.

The temporary relaxation of sanctions by the Trump government allowed Moscow to increase revenues from energy exports, at a time when its economy is stifled by the war in Ukraine. On the other side of the Atlantic, countries such as Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Argentina and Guyana see opportunity. Global search for alternative suppliers gives them room to increase their productive power and political weight.

China as the big winner
If there is a net winner in the new energy equation, this is China. The global effort to diversify energy networks, to shift renewable sources and the need to store and manage electricity flows lead almost inevitably to Beijing. China is overwhelmingly leading in the production of wind turbines, photovoltaics, batteries, transformers, high voltage cables and energy management software. That gives her something much bigger than a commercial advantage. It gives her strategic influence.

The more countries try to reduce their dependence on Gulf oil, the more they risk increasing their dependence on the Chinese industrial chain of green energy. Yesterday's energy security was tied to tankers and oil wells. Tomorrow's energy security may be tied to batteries, panels and rare earths. The Trump government's stance strengthens this trend. The aggressive attempt to stop renewable projects in the United States, even with payments to companies for the cancellation of wind parks, leaves China room to dominate a sector that will determine the industrial power of the next decades.

In simple terms, the United States risks retiring from a global technological battle at the time their main opponent has already taken a lead.

The Straits of Hormuz will never be the same again.
The Straits of Hormuz have been for decades more than sea passage. It was the artery of the global energy economy. The Iranian crisis has shown that this artery can be pressed, controlled, turned into a leverage or blackmail. Even if navigation gradually returns, the sense of certainty is lost. Iran has shown that it can interrupt or restrict traffic whenever it deems it necessary. She has also pressed for charges on ships passing through the strait, a move that could conflict with international rules, but captures Tehran's intention to turn its geography into an economic and political tool.

The cost of this uncertainty is significant and not negligible and this will seem short-term. Locker, fare, delays, security reserves, route changes - everything goes up. And eventually everything goes to prices. Tehran does not need to close the Ormuz completely to influence the global economy. As long as he convinces the markets he can do it.

The blow to confidence in the Gulf
The crisis also struck the image of the Gulf as a zone of stability, wealth and secure investment. The blows in Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Emirates and other countries showed that the prosperity of the region has a more fragile basis than it was presented. The damage to Qatar's natural gas facilities, which affected a significant part of its export capacity in LNG, was significant and is mainly beyond economic, credibility blow.

For Saudi Arabia, the bombing of a petrochemical complex restores fear that its critical infrastructure remains exposed. For the United Arab Emirates, attacks on hotels, data complexes and nuclear installations directly hit the image they have built for years: a secure hub of financial services, trade, tourism and technology. Dubai and Abu Dhabi are not only selling infrastructure. They sell stability. If this is contested, investors and visitors will request a higher risk premium. Some people will look away.

The American security guarantee that is being thrown dangerously
The heavier costs concern the United States. For decades, American power in the Persian Gulf has been based on a simple promise: the US can guarantee the free navigation and security of trade flows. The crisis showed the limits of this promise. Donald Trump's decision to cause conflict with Iran, coupled with instability in policy making, further undermined confidence in Washington. Allies in Europe see a partner who can trigger crises, but not always control their evolution.

Regional forces see that American military power remains enormous, but not all-powerful. Iran, despite the blows, continued to resist and disrupt navigation. This creates a new precedent. Not because Tehran got stronger than Washington. But for proving that it can increase the cost of American domination to a critical point on the planet. This image has consequences. China will use it. Russia too. The Gulf countries will become more multi-centre in their relations. And Europeans will be forced to reconsider what security means when the American umbrella is no longer considered self-evident.

Slower growth, more expensive money
The second major wave of impact passes from energy to inflation and from there to interest rates. At the beginning of the year, the world economy seemed to be stabilizing. Inflation declined, growth held, trade had been hit but had not collapsed. The Middle East war changed the image. The World Bank revised its forecasts lower, seeing global growth drop to 2.5% this year from 2.9% in 2025. Inflation returns. In the United States he rose for a third consecutive month, reaching an annual rate of 4.2% in May. The European Central Bank increased interest rates to 2.25%, recognizing that the Middle East war is creating new inflationary pressures. The problem is not just fuel prices.

It's the chain effect. Transport, food, industrial production, insurance, borrowing, public debt. When energy becomes more expensive and uncertain, the whole economy operates at higher cost. Higher interest rates are already pushing over-charged states. Rich and poor countries have accumulated huge public debt. A growing portion of their revenue now goes to interest service. If at the same time they must support households against energy accuracy and increase military spending, the budgetary margins are narrow. The Asian economies, most hit by the energy crisis, are already turning to emergency funding. The Asian Development Bank accepts increased loan demands, as governments are trying to protect economies and budgets from the consequences of the war.

The next day will be more nervous.
The greatest damage to the war may not be reflected in a marker. It is reflected in uncertainty. Businesses will plan more carefully. Governments will keep more reserves. Investors will ask for higher returns to take risks. Consumers will pay more expensive energy, more expensive transport and more expensive money. The global economy is not falling apart. But it's getting stiffer, scarier, more expensive.

The period of cheap energy, safe sea routes and almost automatic confidence in American security has been hit hard. Even if the US-Iran deal lasts, the damage has already been done. China is strengthened in the green industry. Russia finds new breaths.

The Gulf loses part of the aura of undamaged stability. Hormuz is transformed from sea passage to permanent geopolitical risk and Washington sees its image as a guarantor of the world order decaying.